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Abstract
Our paper focuses on the relationship between market concentration and collusion
sustainability in a framework of multimarket contacts. We consider two independent and
symmetric markets in which a subset of ￿rms are active in both markets. When ￿rms are
able to transfer market power from one market to another, ￿rms have strong incentives
to collude even in a highly competitive market. This result is relevant for competition
policy since assessing market concentration using HHI index could be misleading in some
situations.
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Competition policy traditionally distinguishes between market structures and market behaviors.
Concerning the control of market structures, competition authorities focus on the degree of
market concentration. For this reason, many concentration indexes have been built as HHI
or concentration ratio as CR1, CR3 and so on. Among them, the Hirschmann Her￿ndhal
Index (HHI) is certainly the most used on market reports. Concerning the control of market
behaviors, an academic literature focuses on the distorsive behaviors.1
However, a few works have study the link between both kinds of market control although
it seems that they show strong interactions. It is nevertheless essential to underline these links
between market structures and market behaviors in the implementation of competition policy.
In a simple model of price competition repeated game, it can be shown that a decrease in the
number of ￿rms facilitates collusion. This standard result states that little concentrated market
structures entails weaker incentives to collude. Consequently, using concentration indexes seems
not to be in contradiction with the control of behaviors in markets.
Nevertheless, some works have moderated this result. In some cases, highly concentrated
market structures can give strong collusion incentives. For example, Davidson and Denerecke
(1984) show that mergers reduce incentives to collude among ￿rms in the industry. In a similar
setting of dynamic price competition with capacity constraints, Brock and Scheinkman (1985)
show that collusion incentives are low when the market is highly concentrated or in the contrary
when the number of ￿rm is very important. Last, Compte and al. (2002) show that collusion
is more di¢ cult to sustain when concentration creates asymmetries in production capacities.
In that case, increasing HHI index induces sometimes strong incentives to collude.
Our paper studies the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability
in the framework of multimarket contacts literature (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990)). In this
setting, one can show that collusion transfers can be made from a market to another when some
￿rms are active in both considered markets: i.e. they are in "multimarket contacts". In this
case, even in a highly competitive market, ￿rms could get incentives to collude if they are also
supplying customers in less competitive markets. This result is relevant for competition policy
since measuring concentration with HHI index could be misleading. It may not encompass the
behavioral dimension of competition, especially when multimarket contacts are a key feature
of the industry 2.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the benchmark
case without multimarket contact. In sections 3 and 4 multimarket contacts among ￿rms are
introduced; in this framework, we analyze if tacit collusion could be transferred from a market
to another. Section 5 concludes and gives some implications of results in terms of competition
policy. Proofs of Lemma and Propositions are given in an Appendix.
1See for example the survey on collusive behaviors (Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright, Tirole ,2003).
2An interesting empirical paper (Domanico 2007) focuses on this relationship between european electricity
market concentration and collusive behaviours using multimarket contacts framework.
22 Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We model two independents markets (A and B) with an identical demand. Goods supplied on
these markets are supposed to be homogeneous. Supply is provided by n ￿ 1 symmetric ￿rms
in market A, and m ￿ 1 in B. Without loss of generality, we assume market B to be always
less concentrated than market A that is m > n. In this industry, it exists a subset of k ￿rms
(0 ￿ k ￿ n) which are active on both markets: we refer to them as multimarket contacts ￿rms.
This con￿guration means that these ￿rms supply the good in both markets A and B.
As it is standard in the analysis of tacit collusion (see Friedman, 1971), we consider an
in￿nitely repeated Bertrand price competition game. The punishment strategy for a given ￿rm
corresponds to trigger strategy consisting in a reversion to a static competitive equilibrium.
We denote ￿
p
h = 0;8h = A;B, the individual pro￿t gained from a punishment strategy for all
active ￿rms in market h. We denote ￿c
h individual collusion pro￿t. The determination of ￿c
h
generally depends on the way the collusive agreement is reached as well as on various factors.
Last, ￿d
h represents the individual pro￿t gained from deviating from the collusive agreement
and corresponds here to the monopolist outcome in market h, we denote ￿h. One can thus












Whenever3 ￿ ￿ ￿h, collusion is sustainable in market h.
Hereafter, we will consider that market conditions (demand, costs and so on) in markets A
and B are identical ; one can write ￿A = ￿B = ￿.
2.2 Collusion Incentives without multimarket contact
As a benchmark, we study collusion incentives in the case where multimarket contacts are not
possible i.e. k = 0. Because of symmetry among ￿rms, individual collusive pro￿ts are just






Then using (1), the critical discount factors in both markets are given by
￿








One can easily link up the incentives to collude (i.e. ￿
h) to the market concentration degree
traditionally measured by the Hirschman-Her￿ndhal Index (HHI)4. In this benchmark case,




























3Here ￿ 2 [0;1] represents the common discount factor in both markets.
4HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each ￿rm competing in the market and summing
3Then we can write thresholds for the discount factor as simple linear functions of the respective
HHI in each market that is:
￿
A = 1 ￿ HHI
A and ￿
B = 1 ￿ HHI
B
It does appear an inverse relationship between the value of these thresholds and HHI￿ s. Clearly
on a given market, the lower HHI is, the less sustainable collusion is.
Collusion is then sustainable in both markets if and only if the discount factor ￿ in the
industry is such that ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ = maxf￿
A;￿
Bg. We call the maximum value for these discount
factors as the critical discount factor. In that case, with m > n, the sustainability condition in
both markets boils down to ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ = ￿
B.
Remark 1 Without multimarket contact among ￿rms, the HHI test is not con￿icting with the
analysis of tacit collusion
A competitive market structure (i.e. a weak HHI level) is linked with pro-competitive
behaviors (￿
B high). This is the conventional wisdom in the ￿eld of competition policy.
In the following, we study market structures with multimarket contacts and we analyze how
such contacts could increase incentives for ￿rms to collude.
3 Multimarket Contacts and "Business as Usual"
In this section, we analyze collusion incentives in the industry in the case where some ￿rms (k >
0) are active in both markets A and B. Here, we consider that coordination to a given collusive
agreement allows ￿rms to keep their customers with respect to the competitive (Bertrand)
equilibrium. As a result in case of collusion, market shares are assumed to be "frozen": ￿rms
"in contact" in both markets does not modify the market sharing. In short, a "business as
usual" principle applies.
Now we have to distinguish three thresholds for the discount factor according to the type
of ￿rm. The factor ~ ￿
A
corresponds to active ￿rms in the single-market A and ~ ￿
B
corresponds
to those active in the single-market B. Last ~ ￿ represents the discount factor for k active ￿rms
in both markets. Using again relation (1), we obtain easily thresholds for the discount factor
for ￿rms without multimarket contact ~ ￿
A
= 1 ￿ 1
n and ~ ￿
B
= 1 ￿ 1
m.
To determine this threshold for each ￿rm in contact in both markets A and B, the "business
as usual" assumption leads to de￿ne each ￿rm￿ s collusive pro￿t as the sum of collusive pro￿ts on
each market. This is due to the fact that market shares remain at their egalitarian competitive
levels (1
n or 1




















4As seen in the section 2, it is easy to write this factor as a function of HHI￿ s in both markets
A and B:





We ￿nd also the same kind of inverse relation that was previously established between the
discount factor and the HHI calculated in each market. One can directly found5 that ~ ￿ < ~ ￿
B




;~ ￿g) is clearly ~ ￿
B
.
Therefore, collusion is sustainable in both markets A and B if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
B6.
Remark 2 When "business as usual" applies, multimarket contacts do not constitute a struc-
tural factor making easier collusive agreements.
This remark is directly linked to the "business as usual" assumption. Indeed since no direct
link exists between markets7, collusion transfers from market A towards B can only occur if
active ￿rms in both markets give incentives for "single-market ￿rms" to collude. Such incentives
could be developed if market sharing in case of collusive agreements is modi￿ed. In that case,
we have to enlarge the framework of our paper relaxing the "business as usual" assumption.
4 Multimarket contacts and collusion transfers
We eliminate now the assumption of market shares freeze in order to allow active ￿rms in both
markets to transfer their collusive power from a market to another. Firstly, this leads us to
de￿ne new collusive market shares ; secondly, this allows to calculate the critical discount factor
in that case.
4.1 Sustainable market shares and critical discount factors
We denote now sA and sB collusive market shares (resp. in market A and B) for a ￿rm in
contact in both markets. These shares are then de￿ned by:
sA = minf￿A; 1
ng and sB = minf￿B; 1
mg (3)
where ￿h 2 [0;1] with h = A;B: This de￿nition of market shares simply explains that a given
￿rm which is in contact on several markets can be encouraged to reduce his market share (from
1
n to ￿A and/or from 1
m to ￿B) in order to increase collusion incentives for other ￿rms. For
instance in market A, the gap between 1
n and ￿A represents the opportunity cost that an active
￿rm in both markets has to bear in order to increase the incentives for other ￿rms to collude.
5Indeed e ￿
B
￿e ￿ = m￿n
2(nm) > 0.
6It is important to underline that collusion sustainability in all markets does only depend on the degree of
concentration in the market B.
7Demands in markets A and B are totally independents.
5The individual collusive market share ￿A for a single-market ￿rm in market A (without
contact), is de￿ned by the linear equation (n ￿ k)￿A + ksA = 1. Solving it in ￿A yields
￿A =
1￿ksA
n￿k . Symmetrically, we obtain ￿B =
1￿ksB
m￿k for a single-market ￿rm in B:
As in section 3, we obtain the threshold for the discount factor for active ￿rms in each
single market h = A;B (denoted ~ ￿
h
) as well as for active ￿rms in both markets (~ ￿). The new
de￿nition (3) of market shares modi￿es these thresholds: they do not only depend on market
structures (n and m) but also on the number of active ￿rms in both markets (k). Using relation










The expression of this threshold depends on the value of sA. Using (3) one can rewrite it as a





















The threshold for the discount factor for active ￿rms in the single-market B is de￿ned in the





















Finally, for ￿rms with multimarket contacts, the threshold for the discount factor writes:
~ ￿ =
2￿ ￿ (sA￿ + sB￿)
2￿
It takes di⁄erent values according to the de￿nition (3) of market shares sA and sB. Indeed, we
have to di⁄erentiate between situations where the market shares are "frozen" on a given single
market (A or B) and situations where they are simultaneously "frozen" in both markets. More
precisely, this threshold rewrites:
~ ￿ =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <









































4.2 Critical discount factors
In order to determine the sustainability conditions in both markets, it is su¢ cient to analyze
the corresponding critical discount factor denoted ~ ￿
￿





6loss of generality, we proceed the analysis assuming ￿B < ￿A.8













(n;m) 2 X (￿A;￿B;k)
(n;m) 2 Y (￿A;￿B;k) (7)
where X (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m) 2]k; 1
￿B[2jn < m < maxfm0;m1gg; Y (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m) 2
]k;1[2jm ￿ maxfm0;m1;ngg with m0 =
2+k(￿A￿￿B)
￿A+￿B and m1 =
2n+k(1￿n￿B)
1+n￿B .





for the discount factor. They allow to study incentives to collude for each type of ￿rms that
depend on the values of parameters (n;m;k;￿A;￿B).
Intuitively, active ￿rms in the single-market A have more incentives to collude. They are
active in the most concentrated market, so the gain derived from a deviation strategy is rela-
tively lower than for ￿rms supplying single-market B (less concentrated): the deviation pro￿t















Figure 1: Analysis of collusion transfers
On the other hand, for active ￿rms in the single-market B and for ￿rms with multimarket
contacts, the analysis of the incentives to collude is not so obvious. Figure 1 summarizes this
analysis in the plane (n;m). More precisely, ￿gure 1 represents critical discount factors in the
plane (n;m) as de￿ned in lemma 1. In this ￿gure, one can see the values of parameters for
which active ￿rms in both markets (respectively without contact in market B) have stronger
incentives to deviate (area X(:)) (respectively area Y (:)).
8On the same way, one can obtain the same type of results in the case where ￿A < ￿B and m < n.
7Within area X, market B is relatively weakly competitive (m < m0 < 1
￿B). In that case,
the market B share which is supplied by active ￿rms in both markets does not depend directly
on the number of active ￿rms in this market since sB = ￿B < 1
m. Incentives to collude for these
￿rms (i.e. ~ ￿) is therefore independent of the intensity of competition in this market. However,
incentives for ￿rms without contact in market B does depend on m through their market share
given by ￿B =
1￿k￿B
m￿k . For a given k , the incentives to collude are higher for active ￿rms in the
single-market B and increase with the concentration of market (low value of m). Consequently,
for a low level of concentration in market B (m < m0), the active ￿rms in both markets have
strongest incentives to deviate. Within area X, collusion is then sustainable as ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
= ~ ￿.
However, as soon as market A is very competitive (n > 1
￿B), this area vanishes.
In area Y , two situations have to be distinguished. First, when market B remains concen-
trated (m0 < m < 1
￿B), the incentives to deviate for active ￿rms in both markets is independent
from the corresponding market structure (i.e. sB = ￿B). Second, as market B becomes more
competitive (m > 1
￿B), the share of market B supplied by ￿rms with contacts in both markets
corresponds to the situation where sB = 1
m i.e. a freeze of market shares. In that case, their
incentive to collude is now linked to the structure of market B. Within this area Y , collusion





A simple comparative statics with respect to the number of ￿rms with multimarket contacts
(k) allows to state the following result.
Proposition 1 The number of ￿rms with multimarket contacts is a structural factor facilitating
collusion in both markets.
When the number of ￿rms with multimarket contacts (k) is increasing, the area X is ex-
panding but the area Y is reducing since the frontier m0 is moving upward. In this case, the
share of ￿rms that are supplying in both markets is very high and the number of (m ￿ k)
active ￿rms in the single market B is very low; in that case, their bene￿t from a deviation
is diminishing since their collusion pro￿t is growing. One can also underline that the critical
discount factor decreases with the number of active ￿rms in both markets. Paramater k can
be considered therefore as a structural factor facilitating collusion in markets9. This critical
threshold decreases as a function of k. As the number of ￿rms with contacts in both markets
is relatively high, it becomes constant with respect to k since it is equal to ~ ￿.
4.3 Collusion transfers
Now we make the comparison between both critical discount factors in two previous frameworks:
the situation where some ￿rms are active in both markets (i.e. ~ ￿
￿
) and the benchmark case
without multimarket contact (￿
￿ de￿ned in section 2).
Figure 2 synthesizes the analysis of the critical discount factors and shows the area (de-
pending on the parameter values) in which the existence of multimarket contacts is a structural
9In a sense this result strengthens the classical result stating that multimarket contacts facilitates collusion.
See for example Ivaldi et al. (2003).
8factor facilitating collusion transfers from the less concentrated market (i.e. market A) to the
















Figure 2: Regions for the critical discount factor
In this ￿gure, one can distinguish three areas denoted R1,R2 and R3 according to the values
of parameters. Within locus R1 and R3, multimarket contacts do not increase the incentives
for ￿rms to collude. In both regions, the critical discount factor threshold does not decrease
with the number of active ￿rms in both markets: ~ ￿
￿
> ￿
￿. In the area R2, presence of ￿rms
with contacts in both markets entails more incitations for ￿rms to collude in market A and
also in market B. One can precise these results when market B becomes more competitive (m
increases at n given).
As market B is relatively concentrated (m < 2
￿A+￿B), we have ~ ￿
￿
> ￿
￿ (in area R1): no
collusion transfer occurs. Indeed initially, without multimarket contact, the critical discount
factor is already very low. Active ￿rms in market B have thus strong incentives to collude
since collusion pro￿ts are shared between few ￿rms. In that case, transferring collusion is too
costly for active ￿rms in both markets since they should give up a too large market share in
market A but also in market B. In this situation, active ￿rms in both markets make collusion




When market B is less concentrated ( 2
￿A+￿B < m < 1
￿B), our results show that ￿rms with
contacts in both markets are able to transfer collusion on this market: ~ ￿
￿
< ￿
￿ (area R2). We
distinguish between two situations according to values of m: (i) whenever 2
￿A+￿B < m < m0
(ii) and whenever m0 < m < 1
￿B.
In the case (i) 2
￿A+￿B < m < m0, market B becomes less concentrated. Individual collusion
pro￿ts for active ￿rms in this market are relatively low. In that case, the critical discount factor
is de￿ned using the incentive constraint for ￿rms with multimarket contacts. These ￿rms are
then able to transfer collusion at a lower cost giving up a relatively small part of their market
9share. On the other side, if (ii) m0 < m < 1
￿B, the critical discount factor in the multimarket






Within the area R3, market B is very competitive (m > 1
￿B); active ￿rms in this market
have then initially a low market share that is sB = 1
m < ￿B. It is then impossible to transfer
collusion since de facto ￿rms with contacts cannot concede an additional part of their market
share.
One can summarize the previous discussion using ￿gure 3 which represents the variation of














Figure 3: Collusion Transfers as a function of m
In this ￿gure, the thick line represents the critical threshold ~ ￿
￿
for which a collusion transfer
is made. More precisely, for n and ￿h given, the ￿gure shows the market B structure for which
￿rms with multimarket contacts are able to transfer collusion.
We can now state the following proposition concerning the impact of market-B concentration
on the incentives to collude for ￿rms in market A.
Proposition 2 When market A is weakly competitive (n < 1
￿A), more concentration in market
B can reduce incentives to collude for ￿rms in market A.
This proposition states a relevant result for competition policy. Usually, more market con-
centration leads to more incentives to collude. Here we show that a reverse result may hold:
with multimarket contacts, a weakly competitive adjacent market (A here) relax incentives to
collude for ￿rms competing in others markets (as B).
The intuition of this result is simple. In order to transfer collusion, ￿rms with multimarket
contacts have to give up a signi￿cant part of their respective market share for ￿rms without
contact. Then ￿rms with multimarket contacts may give up a small market share as collusion
10pro￿ts for single-market ￿rms are low10. In that case, ￿rms with contacts are able to transfer
collusion easily. For example, to transfer collusion towards market B (i.e. ￿B high), collusion
pro￿ts for active ￿rms in single market B must be weak; this is the case when these ￿rms are
numerous (m ￿ k high). The idea is obvious: ability for ￿rms to transfer collusion depends on
their ability to give up market shares that depends on the value of ￿B or on the number of
￿rms (m ￿ k) without contact in market B.
Moreover, one can note that within the "transfer area" R2, the di⁄erence between both
critical factors denoted ￿(m;k) = ￿
￿ ￿~ ￿
￿
is not a monotonic function of m. When the market
B structure is not very competitive ( 2
￿A+￿B < m < m0), the gap ￿(m;k) is increasing in m. In
that case, incentives to transfer collusion increase when market B becomes more competitive.
On the other hand, as market B is su¢ ciently competitive (m0 < m < 1
￿B), incentives to
transfers collusion reverse: they decrease with the number of active ￿rms in market B. It does
exist a degree of market concentration in market B for which incentives to transfer collusion
are at the maximum level, i.e. when m = m0. Last, one can see that this value m0 is increasing
in the number of ￿rms with contacts in both markets (i.e. k). Figure 4 illustrates how the gap













Figure 4: Collusion Transfers: Sensitivity Analysis
We see in the ￿gure that when k is growing (k2 > k1), incentives to transfer collusion are
higher for more competitive market B : m0 is increasing with k. Moreover, one can note that
maximum incentives (corresponding to the structure m = m0), are increasing in k.
So far, we have just considered low level of competition in market A (low level of n). When
market A is more competitive (n > 1
￿A) and market B is weakly concentrated ( 2
￿A+￿B < m <
1
￿B), concentration of market A entails more collusive behaviors for ￿rms in market B.
10This collusion pro￿t decreases with the number of these ￿rms.
114.4 HHI test and Collusion with Multimarket Contacts
In order to analyze the link between incentives to collude and the degree of market concentration
in the situation where k ￿rms are active in both markets, we ￿rst calculate the concentration
indexes HHI for each area R1, R2 and R3 depicted in ￿gure 3.
Hence in areas R1 and R2; HHI for each market writes:
HHI























On the one hand, on can see clearly that HHIh;h = A;B are decreasing functions11 of each
￿h. On the other hand, using relation (7) in Lemma 1, we can see that ~ ￿
B
is an increasing
function of ￿B whereas ~ ￿ is a decreasing function of ￿h, h = A;B. Hence, it follows that ~ ￿
B
is
a decreasing function of HHIB but ~ ￿ is an increasing function of HHI in markets A and B.
In the con￿guration where market A is weakly competitive (n < 1
￿A), we just have proved
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When market B is few concentrated ( 2
￿A+￿B < m < 1
￿B), a low HHI level in
market A or B corresponds to a market structure which facilitates collusion.
This result reverses the established link between collusion sustainability and index of market
concentration (see remarks 1 and 2). In the proposition 3, we show that the analysis of the
market structure (HHI test) could generate results in contradiction with results of the analysis
of ￿rms behaviors (collusion test). In particular, whenever m < m0, the critical discount factor
(which would be the correct but unobservable collusion test) increases whereas HHI decreases.
This re￿ ects the situation where more competitive markets A or B could strengthen incentives
to collude for some ￿rms in these markets.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show how the relationship between market concentration and collusive be-
haviors can be modi￿ed when ￿rms are active on several independent markets (￿rms with
multimarket contacts). It turns out that in particular market con￿gurations, the well-known
HHI test could generate results opposite to those obtained with the analysis of market behav-
iors, particularly the control of collusion.
Concerning the competition policy, three interesting results are underlined. First, the pres-
ence of active ￿rms in both markets could increase incitations to collude. In that case, the
concentration index HHI would be calculated on larger relevant markets. It is therefore neces-





n￿k < 0 and analogically for @HHI
B
@￿B :
12there is no collusion transfers from a geographic market to another. Second, the entrance of a
￿rm in a market allows to improve concentration index and to decrease the HHI value. This
entrance is therefore very favorable from a structural point of view. However, if this new ￿rm
is also active in a more concentrated market, her entrance in the more competitive market
would increase incitations for other ￿rms to collude. Indeed, this active ￿rms in both market
could give up market shares on her new market in order to incite other ￿rms to collude. In
that case, the entrance of a ￿rm (decrease of HHI) could give more incitations to collude and
could be therefore harmful. Third, the process of concentration on a market could question
previous collusive agreements and therefore could be favorable in terms of competition policy.
More precisely, if the HHI value is increasing on the more competitive market, active ￿rms in
both markets could have more di¢ culties to incite other ￿rms to collude. In this context, for a
coherent competition policy, it is better to analyze the relative levels of market concentration
on which ￿rms are active and not only absolute HHI level on each independent relevant market.
Such a coherent analysis would allow to control the structure of market linked to the control
of collusive behaviors of ￿rms.
6 Appendix
￿ Proof of Lemma 1. From relation (7) in the text we know that ~ ￿
￿





de￿ne three di⁄erences ~ ￿1 = ~ ￿￿~ ￿
A
; ~ ￿2 = ~ ￿￿~ ￿
B




and study them according
to (n;m;k;￿A;￿B).
First, suppose that m > 1
￿B and n > 1
￿A then we turn back in the situations of sections 2
and 3 where ~ ￿
h
= ￿
h for h = A;B then ~ ￿2 = ￿ m￿n
2(nm) < 0 and ~ ￿3 = m￿n
nm > 0. This implies
















Second, suppose that 1
￿B ￿ m > n > 1
￿A then from (4)-(6) in the text, we have (a)
~ ￿3 = 1
n ￿
1￿k￿B
m￿k which is bounded below by 1
n ￿ 1
m > 0. Thus ~ ￿3 > 0 and the sign of ~ ￿1




n] moreover ~ ￿2 = 0 when m = m1 where
m1 =
2n+k(1￿n￿B)
1+n￿B : This value m1 is an increasing concave function of n which takes values
m1 =
2+k(￿A￿￿B)
￿A+￿B ￿ m0 if n = 1
￿Aand m1 = 1





(m￿k)2 < 0, ~ ￿2
is monotonic and decreasing in m, so ~ ￿2 ￿ 0 when m 2]n;m1] and when m 2]m1; 1
￿B] then
~ ￿2 < 0: To sum up ~ ￿
￿








> maxf~ ￿;~ ￿
A
g if m 2]n;m1].
Third if m > 1
￿B > 1
￿A > n then again using (4)-(6): (a) ~ ￿3 =
1￿k￿A
n￿k ￿ 1
m is again bounded
below by 1
n ￿ 1
m > 0, so ~ ￿3 > 0 and studying ~ ￿1 is useless but (b) ~ ￿2 = 1
2[ 1







￿B > m and 1




2 is decreasing in n and is zero
for n =
2￿k(￿A￿￿B)
￿A+￿B ￿. Moreover n0 > 1
￿A since n0 ￿ 1
￿A =
(1￿k￿A)(￿A￿￿B)
(￿A+￿B)￿A > 0: Consequently
~ ￿1 > 0 that is ~ ￿ > ~ ￿
A




2 is decreasing in m and is zero for m = m0,
but m0 < 1
￿B since m0 ￿ 1
￿B = ￿
(1￿k￿B)(￿A￿￿B)
(￿A+￿B)￿A < 0. Hence ~ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
B
if m 2]n;m0] and ~ ￿ < ~ ￿
B
13if m 2]m0; 1
￿B]. (c) ~ ￿3 =
(￿A￿￿B)k2+(n￿B￿m￿A)k+m￿n
(m￿k)(n￿k) is monotone increasing in m and is zero
for m =
1￿k￿B
1￿k￿An ￿ k2 ￿A￿￿B
1￿k￿A ￿ m2 where m2 is increasing in n and take the values m2 = n
if n = k < 1
￿A and m2 = k +
1￿k￿B
￿A < m0 if n = 1










if m 2 [m2; 1






￿ ~ ￿ > ~ ￿
A
; (ii) if m 2 [m2;m0[ then ~ ￿
￿




and (iii) if m 2]n;m2[ then
~ ￿
￿










if (n;m) 2 Y (￿A;￿B;k) where Y (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m) 2]k;1[2jm ￿ maxfm0;m1;ngg
~ ￿
￿
= ~ ￿ if (n;m) 2 X (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m) 2]k; 1
￿B[2jn < m < maxfm0;m1gg
￿ Proof of Proposition 2. We just have to show that the low boundary of the subset









1+n￿B > 0 in their respective de￿nition domains (see A above).
￿ Collusion Transfers. We have to give the sign of the di⁄erence ￿￿ = ~ ￿
￿
￿ ￿








￿B > m0 ￿ m and 1
￿A > n then ￿￿ = 1
m ￿
￿A+￿B
2 is decreasing in m and is equal to zero
for m = 2
￿A+￿B ￿ m3: Moreover, we have m3 < m0 since m3 ￿ m0 = ￿k
￿A￿￿B




B if m Q m3.
b. If 1
￿B ￿ m1 ￿ m and n > 1




2 is decreasing in m and is equal to zero
when m = 2n
1+n￿B ￿ m4: We have therefore m4 ￿ m1 since m4 ￿m1 = ￿k
1￿n￿B
1+n￿B ￿ 0: Moreover,
if n = 1
￿A then m4 = m3 and if n = 1
￿B then m4 = m1 = 1
￿B. In that case, ~ ￿
￿
R ￿
B if m Q m4.
One can de￿ne the area R1 as a subset R1 ￿ X (￿A;￿B;k) such that R1 (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m) 2
]k; 1
￿B[2jn < m ￿ maxfm3;m4gg.






￿B > m > m0 and 1
￿A > n then ￿￿ = ￿
k(1￿m￿B)





￿B > m ￿ m1 and n > 1
￿A. We can de￿ne area R2 as a subset of X (￿A;￿B;k) [ Y (￿A;￿B;k)
such that R2 (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m) 2]k; 1
￿B[2jmaxfm3;m4g < m ￿ 1
￿Bg
b. If m > maxf 1
￿B;ng then ~ ￿
B
= ￿
B and ￿￿ = 0:
This allows to de￿ne the area R3, subset of Y (￿A;￿B;k) so that R3 (￿A;￿B;k) = f(n;m)jm >
maxf 1
￿B;ngg:
￿ Study of ￿(m;k) in locus R2. We denote in the text ￿(m;k) = ￿
￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
= ￿￿￿. If
(n;m) 2 R2 (￿A;￿B;k) and if n < 1
￿A then, we shown above that:




* For m0 ￿ m < 1
￿B, ￿(m;k) =
k(1￿m￿B)









(m￿k)2 > 0 and we show that
@m0
@k > 0.















Moreover, if n < 1
￿A then ~ ￿
B
is an increasing function of ￿B since @~ ￿
B
@￿B = k
m￿k > 0. On an other
side, ~ ￿ is a decreasing function of ￿A and ￿B since @~ ￿
@￿h = ￿1
2 < 0 for h = A;B.
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